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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1987 & Supp. 
1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Tax Commissions's factual finding that 
Respondent is not barred from assessing a deficiency for the 
audit period because Petitioner's accounting manager had the 
authority to sign a waiver is supported by substantial evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing factual determinations the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l6(4)(g) 
1 
(1987 & Supp. 1991), requires this Court to review the whole 
record and determine whether the Tax. Commission's findings are 
supported by "substantial evidence." "'Substantial evidence' is 
that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Boston 
First Nat, v. Salt Lake City Bd., 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 
1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1987 & Supp. 1991) 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis 
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made 
or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court; . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(8) (1987 & Supp. 1991) 
Except if a deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade 
tax or of a failure to file a return, the amount of taxes imposed 
by this chapter shall be assessed within three years after the 
return was filed and if not so assessed no proceeding for the 
collection of the taxes shall be begun after the expiration of 
the period. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 3, 1990, in response to taxes assessed against it 
by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission 
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("Division"), Radix Corporation ("Petitioner") commenced formal 
adjudicative proceedings before the Utah State Tax Commission 
("Respondent"). Record at 137. On January 8, 1991 Respondent 
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Decision. Id- 0 n January 28, 1991, Petitioner filed a petition 
for reconsideration which was subsequently denied by Respondent's 
order issued February 21, 1991. Record at 19 & 117. Petitioner 
now appeals to this Court for review of Respondent's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent correctly found that the Division is not barred 
from assessing Petitioner Utah sales and use tax for the period 
January 1, 1986 to March 31, 1987 because Petitioner's accounting 
manager, pursuant to her authority, executed a valid statute of 
limitations waiver. Respondent's finding is supported by 
substantial evidence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the audit of Petitioner's books, Diane Fanger, 
Petitioner's accounting manager, was present and assisted Gary M. 
Allred, the Division's auditor, by providing requested documents. 
Tr. at 34. When Petitioner's accounting manager was unable to 
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provide requested documents, she would indicate that she had to 
consult with or seek permission from her supervisor, Timothy 
Draper. Tr. at 34 & 35- On or about April 14, 1989 the Division 
presented Petitioner's accounting manager with an "Agreement, 
Waiver of Statute of Limitations." Record at 152. The waiver 
functioned to extend the period of time during which Petitioner 
could review the preliminary audit findings without creating a 
statute of limitations defense which would jeopardize collection 
of the assessment. Record at 152. After having the waiver fully 
explained to her, Petitioner's accounting manager executed the 
agreement never indicating that she either did not have the 
authority to sign, or that she needed anyone's approval. Tr. at 
33 & 34. Further, the Division's auditor never had any reason to 
question Petitioner's accounting manager's authority to execute 
the waiver. Tr. at 36. The only evidence presented at the 
formal hearing before Respondent that Petitioner's accounting 
manager did not have authority to sign the agreement was a 
statement by Timothy Draper that •'[c]ompany policy specifically 
does not give her authority to sign those things . . . ." Tr. at 
21. In its decision, after considering Timothy Draper's 
testimony, Respondent noted Mthat the Petitioner presented no 
further evidence regarding the authority of the accounting 
manager either by way of a copy of the company policy, the 
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company's bylaws, or the testimony of any other corporate 
officer." Record at 139. Respondent thus found: 
Petitioner's mere assertions that the accounting 
manager did not have the authority to sign the statute 
of limitation waiver agreement, when viewed in light of 
all the evidence presented, does not support a finding 
that the accounting manager acted outside the scope of 
her authority. Therefore the Tax Commission finds that 
the Respondent [the Division] is not barred from 
assessing a deficiency for the audit period in question 
by the statute of limitations. 
Record at 140. 
ARGUMENT 
A. RESPONDENT'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S ACCOUNTING 
MANAGER HAD AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE A VALID STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS WAIVER IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
Respondent's finding that Diane Fanger, Petitioner's 
accounting manger, had authority to execute a statute of 
limitations waiver is supported by substantial evidence; hence, 
its decision should be affirmed. 
Actual authority may be either express or implied. 3 Am Jur 
2d, Agency, § 73. "The actual authority of an agent may be 
implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the facts 
and circumstances attending the transaction in question." Bowen 
v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978); Zions First National 
Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988). 
As evidenced by the record, the words and conduct of 
Petitioner's accounting manager established her authority by 
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implication to execute the statute of limitations waiver. Id. 
While conducting the audit of Petitioner, the Division dealt 
directly with Petitioner's accounting manager. During that time, 
the Division requested numerous items from Petitioner. 
Petitioner's accounting manager provided those items. If there 
were documents or information that she was not authorized to 
provide, "she would indicate that she'd either have to get these 
from Tim Draper or talk to Tim Draper." Tr. at 34. Thus, by her 
words and conduct, Petitioner's accounting manager implied that 
while she had authority to produce some information, she did not 
have authority to produce all that was requested, in which case 
she would obtain the necessary authorization. In essence, she 
defined the scope of her authority. 
When the Division's auditor requested that Petitioner sign 
the Waiver of Statute of Limitations, Petitioner's accounting 
manager never stated or otherwise indicated that she did not have 
the authority to do so or that she needed anyone's approval. 
Rather, Petitioner's accounting manager, after having the 
document fully explained to her, executed the waiver. 
Petitioner's accounting manager's lack of any statement 
indicating that executing the document was beyond the scope of 
her authority and her conduct of signing the waiver established 
her authority by implication. Bowen, 576 P.2d at 864; Zions 
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First National Bank, 762 P.2d at 1095-
Further, the actual authority of Petitioner's accounting 
manager may be implied from the facts and circumstances attending 
the audit. Id. The record indicates that the Division's auditor 
dealt primarily with Petitioner's accounting manager throughout 
the audit and that she oversaw the audit on Petitioner's behalf. 
These facts indicate that it was she who had the authority to 
execute the waiver. Further, the audit involved corporate 
records and documents which are those ordinarily created and 
maintained by a corporate accounting manager. Moreover, a 
preliminary audit is typically reviewed by a corporation's 
accounting manager who then confers with its officers and 
directors. Therefore, under such circumstances, it was well 
within the responsibility and authority of Petitioner's 
accounting manager to decide whether or not to create additional 
time to review the preliminary audit. Hence, the facts and 
circumstances attending the audit further indicate that 
Petitioner's accounting manager impliedly had authority to 
execute the waiver. 
Petitioner attacks Respondent's determination on several 
grounds. In its brief, Petitioner points to the fact that its 
accounting manager "neither holds any corporate office nor was 
given specific authority to waive legal defenses of the 
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corporation." Petitioners brief at 4 (emphasis added). 
Petitioner further argues that Respondent offered no "testimony 
or corporate documents from any source that would establish a 
grant of authority to Ms. Fanger . . . ." Id. However, 
Petitioner's argument fails because the issue here is whether 
Petitioner's accounting manager had implied actual authority, not 
whether she had express actual authority. Therefore, any lack of 
testimony or documents evidencing a express grant of authority is 
irrelevant. 
Further, Petitioner argues that Timothy Draper's 
"uncontradicted testimony" established that no policy allowed 
Petitioner's accounting manager to execute the waiver and that it 
is "pure guesswork" to assume that Petitioner's accounting 
manager could be vested with authority to sign the waiver.1 
Petitioner's brief at 8. Notwithstanding, "Implied authority 
embraces authority to do whatever acts are incidental to, or are 
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform, the main 
authority expressly delegated to the agent." Bowen, 576 P.2d at 
864; Zions First National Bank, 762 P.2d at 1095. By examining 
1
 In its brief, Petitioner attempts to support Timothy 
Draper's testimony with the affidavit of Alan C. Reed. 
Petitioner's brief at 8. However, that affidavit was never 
introduced at the formal hearing before the Tax Commission. 
Rather, it was merely attached as "Exhibit A" to Petitioner's 
petition for reconsideration. 
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the purpose of the waiver, it becomes evident that the authority 
Petitioner's accounting manager exercised is a necessary, usual 
and proper function of a corporate accounting manager. 
When conducted, the audit period was well within statute of 
limitations period for assessment* However, because it would 
have been impossible for Petitioner to review the Division's 
preliminary audit before expiration of the three year period, the 
execution of the waiver merely ensured that by giving Petitioner 
additional time to review the audit, the Division was not 
jeopardizing subsequent collection of the taxes owed. In other 
words, the Division did not want to create a previously 
nonexistent defense by merely giving Petitioner additional time 
to review the preliminary audit. 
Petitioner broadly characterizes the authority its 
accounting manager exercised as "authority to waive legal 
defenses of the corporation." Petitioners brief at 8. 
Notwithstanding, this authority is more accurately described as 
simply the authority of an accounting manager to oversee and 
facilitate a tax audit. Such authority is easily considered 
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish the responsibilities 
expressly delegated to a corporate accounting manager and 
therefore encompassed by the doctrine of implied authority. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent found that the Division is not barred by the 
statute of limitations from assessing a deficiency for the audit 
period in question because Petitioner's accounting manager, 
pursuant to her authority, executed a valid waiver. 
The actual authority of Petitioner's accounting manager may 
be implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the 
facts and circumstances attending the audit. As the record 
indicates during the audit the Division dealt primarily with 
Petitioner's accounting manager who, when requested to produce 
information, would either produce the information or state that 
she was not authorized to do so. When requested to sign the 
waiver, Petitioner's accounting manager never indicated that it 
was beyond the scope of her authority to sign the waiver or that 
she needed anyone's approval before she signed. 
The only evidence offered by Petitioner to show that its 
accounting manger did not have authority to sign the waiver was 
the mere statement of Timothy Draper that company policy does not 
specifically grant to its accounting manger the authority to sign 
waivers. Therefore in reviewing the whole record it is evident 
that the Respondent's findings are supported by substantial 
10 
evidence and, hence, should be affirmed, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of October, 1991 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
By aad Through 
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RICK CARLTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Utah State Tax 
Commission 
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